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THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGELi
BY EDWARD L. SCHAUB
THE disturbing events and tragedies of recent history have
forced upon the attention of all thoughtful men the nature of
the social order in which we are living. They have led to a deeply
serious investigation into the fundamental principles and into the
real significance and value of our present civilization. This has
widened the interest in philosophy. For, some truth there surely
is in Hegel's remark that a philosophy is the mode in which an
epoch exhibits a reflective self-consciousness of its diversified and
yet basically related expressions. Philosophy, moreover, is receiv-
ing impetus from the fact that individuals are being turned by the
forces of circumstance into the search for a satisfactory Lebens-
anschauung. Scientists, on their part, are pressing beyond their
restricted fields to determine the wider bearings of their theories
and to discover a synthesis in which ascertained truths may dwell
together in a meaningful coherence. It is keenly realized that the
richly adorned temple of the sciences—to employ a figure of Hegel's
IThis paper was prepared in response to the desire of the Editor to
take some cognizance of the centenary of the death of one of mankind's
master minds.
George William Frederick Hegel died in Berlin, on November 14, 1831,
while at the height of his academic influence and of his philosophic powers.
He was then sixty-one years of age, having been born on August 27, 1770.
His native city was Stuttgart, and the influence of this Swabian environ-
ment, as well as of the upper middle class family to which he belonged, mani-
fested themselves in his attitudes and thought throughout his entire career.
From the elementary schools and the gymnasium of Stuttgart, Hegel
went, in 1788, to the university in Tubingen. Here he was matriculated as
a student of theology. He gave large play, however, to an early acquired in-
terest in Greek literature and ar't, and he turned his attention also to cur-
rent revolutionary movements and to contemporary writers, particularly Rous-
seau, as well as to Kant's teachings concerning the moral autonomy of the
rational individual. He devoted much thought likewise to the relation of
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—must again be given its holy of holies, that is, a metaphysics.
Thus we are witnessing an active quest for a philosophy that issues
from the findings of science and that likewise reckons justly with
the facts of concrete social and historical experience. Such being
the case, is it at all strange that there is a revival of interest in
that particular philosophy which still stands as man's most impos-
ing attempt to bring together into a meaningful whole— or, more
accurately, to set forth methodically the intrinsic relationships that
subsist between—the categories of logical thought, the general con-
cepts of scientific knowledge, the basal characteristics of individ-
ual minds, and the forms and developmental stages of political and
social institutions, of art, of religion, and of those systems of re-
flective interpretation known as philosophy?
Whatever may be the explanation—whether the conditions of
contemporary life (such as those suggested), or the immanent logw
of cultural history in general or of philosophical development in
particular-—the plain fact is that the philosophy of Hegel is today
enjoying a renaissance, even where, as in the country of its birth,
it had for decades commonly been deemed to belong at best in a
museum of speculative constructions.
•"
Kant's ethical doctrines, and of philosophy in general, to theology. All of
this, however, was outside the scope of his academic work in course. The
certificate which he received upon leaving the university— it is interesting to
note—made special reference to his inadequate knowledge of philosophy.
During seven years of tutorship in Bern and Frankfort, Hegel centered
his personal study about the origins of Christianity and its connections with
the Greek and Jewish religions. He wrote a life of Jesus and committed to
paper his thoughts on the relations of Kant's ethical philosophy to the re-
ligion of Jesus. His mind wrestled, among other things, with the problem
of the freedom of the individual in its apparent conflict with institutional and
social authority. He clearly recognized that the principle of freedom ex-
pounded by Kant and Fichte and, in a somewhat different form, expressed b}'
the revolutionary spirit of the age, had very genuine and high claims
;
yet
these, he was forced to believe, must not be allowed to dim the prestige pos-
sessed by the social order in Greek life and thought. The issue was a par-
ticular form of one which, in some context or another, remained important
throughout all of Hegel's thought and writing. The whole and its parts or
members, the universal and the particular, unity and diversity, identity and
difference—in all of these cases, both terms, Hegel contended, must be vigor-
ously pressed, each in its intrinsic relations to the other, if either is to
preserve itself and to possess meaning.
In 1801 Hegel was appointed to a Privat-Docentship, and in 1805 to a
professorship, in Jena. Here he at first collaborated sympathetically with
Schelling, a friend of Tubingen days. Soon, however, he reached independent
views, critical alike of Schelling and of Fichte, whose stormy Jena career
had terminated in 1799 : Critical of Schelling because of the latter's increasing
tendencies toward mysticism and his interpretation of the ultimate princi-
ple of unity as transcendent of differences—a view, Hegel pointed out, which
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Few events in the history of philosophical systems are more
striking than the vicissitudes of the Hegelian system, particularly
within the land where it was first proclaimed. The sun in the intel-
lectual firmament of Hegel's own day, it passed abruptly, shortly
after his death, into almost total eclipse (within the orbit of Ger-
man vision), only within little more than the decade just past to
break forth anew and now to shine with a splendor all but dazz-
ling. German thinkers have of late been moving from the most di-
verse starting-points in the direction of Hegelian doctrines ; Hegel's
works are again the subject of intensive study ;* a new and at-
temptedly definitive edition of Hegel's works is under way ; and
the Second International Hegelian Congress, arranged to com-
memorate the centenary of Hegel's death, was this past month held
in Berlin, and the majority of those on its program were Hegelians
from Germany. '5
In Italy and France the Hegelian doctrines have had a less
checkered career. They have seldom failed of able expounders or
even champions. In English-speaking countries, they have exer-
cised a leading influence ever since the time of their importation,
affords us not the light of day but leaves us in the darkness of the "night
in which all cows are black"; and critical of Fichte because of his exces-
sively abstract conception of the Absolute Ego and his doctrine that the
"ought" is a more basic category than "being," that the "ought-to-be"
preconditions the "is."
Hegel's first great philosophic work, the Phdiwmeiwlogic des Geistes, ap-
peared in 1807. The contents of this book are described by Edward Caird
{Hegel, p. 62) as "a kind of genetic psychology or philosophical 'Pilgrim's
Progress,' in which the individual, beginning with the lowest sensuous con-
sciousness which is possible to a rational being, is gradually led upwards,
by the dialectic of his own thought 'to the highest speculative idea of the
world as an organic system, whose principle of unity lies in the self-conscious
intelligence." The work, however, is so complex, as well as so unique,
that it might with equal or perhaps even greater truth be said to set forth
in dialectical form the perennial types of human experience. In the words
of Loewenberg {Hegc' Selections, Introduction, pp. xviii f.) : "Different and
recurrent views of life—sensuous and intellectual, emotional and reflective,
practical and theoretical, mystic and philistine, sceptical and dogmatic,
empirical and speculative, conservative and radical, selfish and social, religious
and secular—are induced to voice the will to believe in their own exclusive
reasonableness. And reasonable each does appear from the point of view
of its own perspective (Yet each) finds its claim to power rebuked and
impugned The truth is that every particular point of view ineluctably
suffers from a warped perspective The dialectical method (lays) siege
to every typical attitude or belief by rendering its partisan claims logical-
ly ridiculous."
The battle of Jena caused a break of ten years duration in Hegel's
academic career. During this interval he served as editor of a newspaper in
Bamberg (1806-8) and as director of the gymnasium in Nuremberg (1808-16)
;
and, what is of vastly greater significance, he brought out his comprehensive
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and today they have been brought into an even more strategic posi-
tion through the publication of English translations of the Plid-
nonueiiologie des Geistes (by J. B. Baillie, in 1910) and of the
Wisscnschaft der Logik (by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers,
in 1929), as well as of an independent translation of a part of the
latter work, and through the admirable compilation of selections
with which Prof. Loewenberg has enriched the Philosophy Series
of the Modern Students' Library.
What modifications in the interpretation of Hegel may issue
from the fresh study of today, especially in the light of recent trans-
lations, may not confidently be predicted. For we realize that after
Dilthey, in 1905, published Die Jngendgeschichte Hegels, and others
at about the same time studied the early chapters of Hegel's life,
many believed themselves in possession of a new key with which to
unlock the Hegelian philosophy as a whole. Hegel, they contended,
was not a rationalist and panlogist, but was essentially a romantic
and, indeed, a mystic in a very real sense of this term. His dia-
lectical method, they declared, was not the product of speculative
thought, nor should it be regarded as setting forth the movement
Wissenschaft dcr Logik, the one work, as Caird maintains, "which the modern
world has to put beside the 'Metaphysic' of Aristotle" (I.e., p. 75). Hegel's
Logik exhibits the immanent dialectical necessity with which the categories
progress from the most abstract of them all, namely "being," to the Abso-
lute Idea, the self-comprehending Notion," the principle of rational self-con-
sciousness.
While professor of philosophy in Heidelberg (1816-18) Hegel published
the Encyclopadie dcr philosophischcn IVisscnschaften. This treatise offers
us the only statement which Hegel has given us of his philosophical system
as a whole. Unfortunately the material is offered, as the title page of the
book indicates, only "in Outline" ; it takes the form of compact paragraphs
which represent epitomizations or expressions of doctrine which Hegel de-
veloped orally in his university lectures.
From Heidelberg Hegel migrated to the university in Berlin. This in-
stitution he served for thirteen years as a professor, and, during 1830, as rec-
tor. In 1821 there appeared the GrimdUnien der Philosophic dcs Rechts, which
was thus the fourth, as it proved to be the last, of the books published by
Hegel himself. The subject matter is set forth in the manner characteristic
of the writer. Concepts are shown to lead of inner, dialectical necessity
to other concepts by which they are at once annulled and preserved ; they
are shown to be partial truths, which, therefore, are not the truth while
yet they convey a truth, the nature and range of which are disclosed by the
successively more inclusive concepts. These more inclusive concepts, princi-
ples or institutions, as the case may be, are the presupposition of the more
abstract and therefore less self-sustaining ones; they are the rational matrix
of the latter, the medium within which alone these have their life and mean-
ing. In the case of the Philosophic dcs Rechts the development is from "right,"
as abstract,, universal and external, to its antithesis "morality," which is
internal and individual, and then to the synthesis described as the ethical
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of reason. It was, on the contrary, an instrument of emotional in-
terpretation. H'egel's logic, in brief, is a logic of passion, of the
hard wrestling of Hegel's own tragic spirit in its attempt to re-
concile practical antinomies of experience, such as those of un-
happiness and happiness, defeat and victory, profound sorrow and
exultant joy, death and the resurrection. Thus taken, it was al-
leged, Hegel's system as a whole becomes, if not transparent, at
least clearer and more significant. With its penetrating flashes of
imagination, its terms freighted with a wealth of meaning and al-
lusion, its intricately developed themes, dramatic transitions, and
brilliant denouements, Hegel's philosophy, it was said, is the ut-
terance of a soaring spirit who voiced, with passionate earnestness
and philosophic artistry, his concrete reactions to the issues of hu-
man life and to the cosmos in which these have their setting. In-
creasing preoccupation with the Phcnovienology, it seems clear, is
likely to fortify this interpretation of the Hegelian writings. On
the other hand, intensified study of the later works, such as that
of the newly translated Science of Logic, will throw into prom-
inence Hegel's insistent demands that emotion and imagination be
order and represented by the institutions of the family, the civic community,
and, finally, the state. Thus Hegel concluded that the national state is the
source and medium of abstract right and morality, and the order within which
the family and the economic and civic life reach their full possibilities ; that
the national state is the culminating expression of the Absolute in the realm
of objectively manifested spirit, though, to be sure, each particular mani-
festation of it has its p^ace within the process of world history. For this
doctrine, with its associated defence of war, Hegel has often been subjected
to the most severe of criticisms. Whatever may be said, however, respecting
the cogency of his argument, this should not be regarded as a bid for the
favor of the political powers dominating Prussia at the time. It was rather
an honest expression of a mind which in all domains of reality sought the
essential reasonableness of things, which had early been impressed by
Greek civilization and political philosophy, and had been a personal wit-
ness of the consequences of the revolutionary doctrines of abstract individ-
ualism. Hegel was convinced of the necessity of social stability as it is
guaranteed by a comprehensive institution—an institution, however, not so
much vested with power as living in the unreserved loyalties of its members.
During his Berlin professorship Hegel's intellectual influence and pres-
tige increased very rapidly. Not even the efforts of a Schopenhauer could
dislodge him from his position of dominance. He founded a philosophical
school which, with all its changing fortunes, has proved to be as influential
as any in modern history, and which still possesses a vitality sufficient to
destroy, through assimilation, many a movement that may rise up against it.
Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy and on the philosophy of
history, of art, and of religion, were published posthumously from student
notes, and they now form part of the edition of Hegel's works brought out
in 1832-5 in the form of eighteen volumes, later supplemented by a volume
of letters edited by Hegel's son, Karl.
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kept in proper bounds by the critical reason, that reflective thought
be given its rightful sovereignty, and that insight and knowledge
be claimed only where conclusions are rationally comprehended,
that is, are understood not alone in terms of the principles and
processes employed in reaching them, but also in the light of their
underlying assumptions when these are themselves grasped and
definitely justified.
In his introductory preface to the Science of Logic Viscount
Haldane ventures the assertion that "no student of philosophy can
be sure of the ground he is treading unless he has made the effort
required to follow out what Hegel claims to tell him." Hegel's
philosophy an indispensable object of study for all who would
philosophize seriously even today! What thing greater, one might
well ask, could be claimed for any system of thought ? Yet one claim
there is which, if not greater, is at least more sweeping, and it is
this which Hegel did not hesitate himself to advance for the phi-
losophy which he developed. The latter, he insisted, is the absolute
philosophy. It sets forth the final truth; moreover, it does so in
such wise as cogently to exhibit the fact that what it presents is
in fact the truth. Hence it merits not merely the study but also
the acceptance of all who would possess a valid comprehension of
reality.
This claim, extravagant or even preposterous as to some it may
appear, was not the expression of a frenzied, a Nietzschean, or
2This subject is penetratingly analyzed by Dr. Heinrich Levy in his
monograph Die Hegel-Renaissance in der deiitschcn Philosophie, pp. 5ff.
For an illuminating account of the conditions that have led to a renewed in-
terest in metaphysics, more especially on the part of German philosophers,
reference may be made to the essay on "Contemporary Metaphysics" which
Professor Arthur Liebert contributed to the present writer's volume, Phi-
losophy Today (Open Court Publishing Co., 1928).
3 During a visit which the writer was privileged to have in Berlin
with the late Alois Riehl, this distinguished scholar—but twenty years ago
—
inquired how it could be that the Hegelian philosophy, so long discarded
in Germany as essentially misdirected and false, should continue to receive
such high and wide-spread recognition among British and American thinkers.
4As one item in the rapidly growing bibliography, particular reference
may be made to Th. L. Haering's Hegel: Sein IVollen und sein IVerk. Of
this work only the first volume (1929) has as yet appeared. This is a tome
of 785 pages, though the period covered is only that prior to 1802, prior,
therefore to the time when Hegel's system first took form.
5For a glance at the rich and varied program of this Congress, see The
Monist. XLI, 4, (October, 1931), p. 636.
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a bigoted mood. Hegel could logically put forth no other. For
the claim followed from his conception of reality and from his
doctrine concerning the nature and office of philosophy. And these
views, he believed himself to have shown, have their foundation in
the immanent and logically necessary development, throughout the
centuries, of self-critical, reflective thought concerning the world
and man's place therein, and concerning the principles and stand-
points involved in such reflection.
Let us develop this point a bit further. Hegel's comprehensive
system explored, first, the field of logical categories and, secondly,
the domain of physical nature ; then it passed on to the realm
in which nature comes to a consciousness of itself in man, and in
which the meanings and self-conscious purposes of the individual
mind are objectified (and thus in course expanded and rationalized)
into and through social institutions and art, which are superseded
by the direct realization, in religious experience, of man's identity
with the ultimate reality, which is absolute spirit, and finally by
the efl^ort at a rational comprehension (called philosophy) of the
truth vouchsafed by the religious experience l:)Ut embodied by the
latter in imaginative forms. This philosophic comprehension, as
self-conscious rationality, reaches its goal when it understands it-
self as grasping the truth and also as integrally related to the real
order which it knows ; when it possesses a knowledge of its own
genesis and of its development into the clear consciousness of
itself, of the validity of its findings, and of the identity of itself
with the real world. Thus, for Hegel, reality attains to its cul-
minating expression when, in the capacity of self-conscious beings,
it comes to a rational comprehension of itself, and this it does in
philosophy ; and, furthermore, the culmination of philosophy is
that philosophical knowledge of philosophy in which the nature and
the truth of the latter are methodically and rationally set forth, and
in which philosophy has therefore reached its goal. The philosophy
in which the logical development of philosophy thus issues is final.
Its finality is guaranteed by the fact that the principles underlying
other philosophies give way, under active reflection and by an im-
manent rational necessity, to successively ampler and truer princi-
ples until they eventually find in it their logically required com-
pletion. Of this ultimate philosophy two things may be said : it
explicitly recognizes and gives due place to the partial truth of the
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various subordinate systems of thought ; and it satisfies the re-
quirements of the reason which functions as the mainspring of the
succession within which they appear.
Hegel penetrated to the underlying principles of philosophical
systems, and with his marvellous combination of analytic power,
synoptic comprehension, and speculative gifts, set forth at once
the full range of their truth and likewise the limits of their sig-
nificant functioning. Because of this fact he is indeed, as Viscount
Haldane affirms, a most valuable guide for all who would properly
assess the nature and validity of their philosophical views. But
Hegel himself, as we have noted, believed himself to have shown
conclusively that the dialectic of philosophic thought leads inevit-
ably to, and finds logical completion in, one particular system.
This system he therefore felt under compulsion to accept. Hence
he could make no claim for his philosophy short of absoluteness and
finality. Because this philosophy is a philosophy, and because it is
that particular philosophy which is absolute, Hegel was forced
by his doctrines to declare that it embodied the final truth of reality.
Reality, as the foregoing will already have suggested, is for
Hegel definable in terms of that which fully satisfies the require-
ments of reason. Reason, in turn, occupies a place of centrality.
It cannot, in his view, be either an accident or a stranger within
the cosmos. Nor can it be what recent proponents of emergent
evolution represent it: a characteristic of a particular level of
reality or some stage belonging to the series of novelties generated
in the unpredictable processes of an emergent evolution. Still again,
it cannot be what pragmatists and instrumentalists allege: simply
a feature or part of the equipment which, in the first instance, con-
tributes to the survival of certain organic beings by facilitating
their adjustments to environmental conditions, and, in due course,
enhances the values of life by increasing the control over circum-
stances. Reason, for Hegel, yields a knowledge which is other and
higher than that sought by certain of the modern sciences in their
concern for relations of cause and effect and for abstract laws ; it
yields results which transcend the knowledge described by Francis
Bacon in terms of power. Reason, in the Hegelian doctrine, is not
a mere servant of life. Quite the contrary. It is autonomous as
respects its ends, free as respects its activities, and supreme as re-
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spects its value. Reason is the manifestation in finite spirits of that
universal or absolute spirit whose expressions include all that ex
ists and whose being includes within itself all its expressions. Rei
son, therefore, is the principle whereby man comes to find himself
at home in the universe and attains to the insight that this experi-
ence of at-homeness is justifiable ; it is a function of knowing and
not of behavior, of cogition and not of action ; it is central to, in-
deed is constitutive of, finite spirits, and is not merely a part of
their endowment. It is identical with the reason which underlies
all that of which true being may be affirmed. What is real is ra-
tional, and what is rational is real.
That reason may afford truth, and that reason satisfied repre-
sents truth attained, are the necessary assumptions on the part of
all philosophies that would escape the self-contradictory position of
the absolute sceptic who declares it to be true that we may never
characterize any proposition as true. Even those "critical" thinkers
who set out by investigating the powers of mind or of reason to
yield truth, or by seeking to determine the limits of rational knowl-
edge, must employ cognitive processes in their critiques, and so, like
Kant, must—if they would affirm the conclusions to which the^y
come—tacitly assume the validity of reason. To Hegel this seemed
so indisputable that he saw no point in any investigation by pure
reason of itself, of its nature and powers. The latter, he contended,
are manifest in the achievements of reason when employed in its
own characteristic function of rendering intelligible the real world.
Philosophy, therefore, like pre-philosophical cognition, should be-
gin by directing its attention to material that requires interpretation,
and should thenceforth devote itself to the task of comprehending the
nature of that which is to be known. To be sure, reason may con-
cern itself with an examination of achieved knowledge in order
to ascertain the categories and general concepts which the latter
involves. This, however, does not reveal the structure of a mind
in the sense of something that exists independently of, and, as it
were, prior to experience or the world which it knows. Rather does
it aft'ord insight into the structure of knowledge and of the real
world. Categories are not a priori forms of an understanding or
a reason in the sense, for example, of Kant ; they are not imposed
by the mind upon objects in such wise that the outcome is merely
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a mental product, and therefore a knowledge simply of phenomena
as distinguished from an order of things-in-themselves which re-
mains unknown and is unknowable. Categories, Hegel contends, re-
present the structure of the world as rationally comprehended, and
thus of the intelligible, and, therefore, of the real world. The cate-
gories have an ontological, and not simply an epistemological
—
much less a merely psychological—status.
Reason, thus, of necessity begins its tasks with a simple faith in
its own validity. In the course of its operations, however, this faith
is increasingly justified, until, at the conclusion of philosophical
thinking—so Hegel teaches— it shines forth as demonstrably valid.
The philosophy of philosophy, Hegel believed himself to have es-
tablished, discloses the truth that the reason employed in knowing
the world is in principle ''dentical with the reason whose objectified
expressions are the worlds of nature and of social and historical life.
The beginning thus leads to a conclusion which represents the
presupposition of the process as a whole ; the end is its own begin-
ning. Thus we have a circle, and this, according to Hegel, is testi-
mony of the adequacy of the point of view and the procedure
adopted. Such a circle, for example, appears also when one con-
siders the system of the categories. Of these, the most simple, the
most abstract and yet most immediately inescapable, is that of
pure being. From pure being, as the first of the categories, thought
is carried on to ever more inclusive and concrete categories, until it
reaches one in which it attains to complete satisfaction. This it does
in the category of absolute idea, described by Hegel's as that whicU
"contemplates its content as its own self. . . . (and thus) is its own
content, in so far as it ideally distinguishes itself from itself." This
identity of thought and object, of subject and object, is the pre-
supposition of being, and, furthermore, it alone makes intelligible
the movement of thought from this category to the one which is
self-maintaining. The end is at once the fulfillment, the presup-
position and the justification of the beginning, and in so far also
of itself. It, and the entire system, are therefore self-justifying;
they are final and absolute ; reason's faith in itself and claims for
itself are firmly grounded ; the real is rational and the philosophy
which brings this to explicit and methodical exhibition is the ulti-
mate philosophy.
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The philosopher's concern is not with that which may be or will
be—with what may or will happen to him after death, for example
•
—but with that which is. He should not aspire to prophecy but to
wisdom. Wisdom, however, is something that comes when ex-
periences have run their course and serene reflection ponders their
teachings. It is not until the shadows of evening have fallen, as
Hegel reminds us, that the owl of Minerva takes its flight. So, too,
the essential function of philosophy is not the condemnation or the
criticism of the real order under the drive of what individuals or
generations suppose ought to be. Philosophy should rather labor
for a rational comprehension of what eternally is real, and, because
real, is also the ultimate eirenicon for our standards of value.
To put the matter theologically, man should not assert his ideas and
his preferences over against the rational will of God, but should
aspire to know the divine mind and should unwaveringly and in
all piety accept the latter as the norm of goodness and beauty as
well as of truth. It is therefore a degradation and a profanation of
philosophy to subsume it under the instruments of social reform.
The course of history is the march of the absolute spirit in the
world ; it no less than nature is rational and divine. Die Wcltge-
schichte ist das Weltgericht. To understand that this is the case,
and to capture the order of ideas systematically exhibited by his-
tory and nature, is the basic task of philosophy and the highest
activity of man. Property, contract, family, and state, for ex-
ample, are not institutions that have arisen accidentally or that owe
their being to the inventiveness of individual men. Nor is their
justification and meaning to be found in the fact that they satisfy
subjective needs or desires. They express the nature of reality.
Their existence and their essential nature are not fortuitous but
are necessary—not, however, in the sense of being causally deter-
mined by empirical conditions but of belonging to the requirements
of reason. Some truth there doubtless is in the charges that Hegel
was unduly conservative in his social and political theories, that
he "deified" the state (indeed, the Prussian state), and that he was
lamentably insensitive to the injustices and other evils of existing
institutions in general. On the other hand, it should be acknowl-
edged that few, if any, thinkers have more profoundly disclosed
the essential nature and spiritual contributions of the basic insti-
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tutions of modern civilization. And it was at such insight that
Hegel aimed rather than at information concerning how far the
institutions of his own particular day, in the details of their struc-
ture and functioning, were factually true to their essential nature
and rational purpose. In his social philosophy, as throughout, Hegel
concerned himself, not with a description or an analysis of what
factually is but with the exhibition, in methodical form, of rational
requirements and thus of the necessary.
Hegel has at times been accused of bending his energies to
the spinning of imaginative cobwebs. It has been charged that he
was scornful of science and that, in detachment from facts, he
unabashedly forced his mind to a priori speculations of the ex-
tremest and emptiest sort. Scarcely anything could be further
from the truth. He contended, to be sure, that the point of view,
the categories, and the conclusions of the particular sciences were
not the highest, that they belonged to the level of Verstand, of the
"understanding," and not of Vernunft, of "reason." In so doing,
however, he dififered from many of the greatest of thinkers, both
earlier and later, only in the subtlety and thoroughness of his an-
alysis. He himself was well versed in the scientific knowledge of
his generation and contributed not a little to it, especially as con-
cerns the things of the spirit. When the story is finally written of
the genesis and development of the historical method in the so-
cial disciplines and in the interpretation of philosophy, a large chap-
ter will revolve about his work and teaching. His mind, further-
more, was of a deeply realistic cast. He repudiated everything
that savored of the subjective. He attacked all theories of a "pure"
reason, of mind as a spiritual substance or activity separable from
the content of the world known, of a priori "forms" or powers
yielding knowledge in independence of experience. It was his
contention that spirit and reason represent the real qua intelligible,
and in his own procedure he ever remained faithful to this thesis.
Human thought, he maintained, must surrender itself to subject
matter and must throughout loyally accept its governance. Things
must be allowed to reveal their own character ; comprehension is
always from within. Reason must follow der Gang der Sache selbst.
Even "independent," free lance, critiques of concepts and theories
must be eschewed. These must be permitted, yea forced, to tell
their own story • only when given full play will their limitations,
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as well as their value, be disclosed in a genuinely significant way.
Thus Hegel disallows every divorce between mind and its ob-
jects. Nd less emphatically does he decry all attempts to isolate
method from content. Things reveal their nature in their own way.
This way is essential to them and thus enters into our knowledge
of them. All-pervasive is their dialectical character. To compre-
hend matters dialectically, therefore, is to grasp them in their truth
and is not an eccentric method of forcing them into an arbitrary
framework. The dialectical method is not one among others be-
tween which philosophers may choose. It is the one valid and ra-
tionally required method for all thought which, like philosophy,
would be faithful to that to which it addresses itself. The fact is that
"the truth is the whole." Hence every category and general concept,
every theory and phenomenon, every institution and manifestation
of spirit, being instinct with the life of the whole asserts itself
to the utmost ; but, in so doing it betrays the fact that it is not
the whole and thus falls short of the truth. It impinges upon that
which limits it and in this wise it exposes its own limitation. Sincv;,
however, that which limits it is its limitation, the limiting factor
is in so far inherent within itself. To put the matter otherwise,
it represents a thesis which involves an antithesis ; this antithesis,
although genuinely such and therefore distinguishable from the
thesis, is nevertheless the latter's own antithesis, required by its
very nature, and therefore intrinsically related to it. This means
that both thesis and antithesis are integral to a synthesis within
which they have determinate meanings and positions. The syn-
thesis, however, in turn reveals its own limitations. Thus it ac-
quires the status of a thesis with an antithesis of its own, and this
necessitates a fresh synthesis. This condition of affairs prevails
until there finally emerges an all-inclusive synthesis which, as the
rational whole, is self-sustaining ; which, as infinite, confronts ntf
extraneous limitation or antithesis ; and which, as absolute, in-
cludes within itself the entire system of distinctions in the form of
subordinate syntheses with their thetic and antithetic constituents.
Some there are who extol the Hegelian method but thrust aside
what they describe as the body of Hegelian doctrine ; others ac-
cept the latter but find no value in the method. Neither of these
groups would Hegel consider as his disciples. Both depart from
an insistence which to him was fundamental, namely that method
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and results are bound up together, that the constituents of reahty
are dialectical in their own essential nature, that form and con-
tent, mind and its objects, are inseparable.
Thus the dialectical method which Hegel advocated as pre-
requisite to the acquisition and the formulation of the truth seemed
to him an important discovery, rather than an invention in the
strict sense of the term, on the part of philosophy. For this dis-
covery he gave the credit to others. The method had been used, as
he pointed out, by Socrates and Plato, and, in modern times, by
Kant and some of those who had learned from him. It is only
fitting to acknowledge, however, that no previous thinker gave to
it either the scope or the importance which it received at the hands
of Hegel, nor had anyone else employed it so skillfully. On the
other hand, interpreters are to this day disagreed as to whether
the method, as found in the Hegelian philosophy, relates essentially to
concepts and realities, as was above maintained, or simply to at-
titudes and views respecting the world, or to both ; whether it re-
mained and was intended to remain identical throughout the several
fields of its employment, such as logic, philosophy of nature, phi-
losophy of mind, and the transitions between them ; whether, as
Croce contends,''^ its use betrays a confusion between the rela-
tions of abstract aspects of a conception, on the one hand, and, on
the other, of opposities or distinct manifestations of principles
;
whether its setting is the non-temporal realm of essences or the
world of temporal and historical occurrences, or both ; whether, in
case, and when, it is utihzed for historical interpretation, culture
is regarded as continuous and cumulative or as a succession of phe-
nomena different both in form and content and without historic
continuity ; and, whether, in spite of its stress upon development and
movement, and its rejection of formal and of "static" logic," it was
itself, as Liebert maintains,''^ in the last analysis still so infected with
staticism that it must give way to a newer and more vital dialectic
—
a dialectic truer to the problematical character of historical and
<5In his important book translated into English under the title IVhat is
Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Heqel.
"Formal logic was criticized by Hegel on the ground that its laws of
thought are tautologous and its propositions analytical, for which reason it
fails to yield significant knowledge. It belongs essentially at the level of
mechanistic interpretation ; it cannot express the truth of things precisely be-
cause it is indifferent to content. To be true, thought must pulsate with the
life of its objects.
8In his above-mentioned essay on "Contemporary Metaphysics."
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psychological life, in which (to quote Liebert)—"rational elements
are combined with others that are thoroughly irrational, intui-
tive, and neither reducible to nor expressible in conceptual terms,"
the combination being "fundamentally antinomical and paradoxi-
cal."
Similarly divergent also are the findings of scholars with respect
to the details of Hegel's imposing system of speculative or ab-
solute idealism. Upon these differences we may not here enter
without making a still heavier overdraft upon the space at our dis-
posal. Suffice it here to stress some general and fundamental feat-
ures that demarcate and characterize Hegel's philosophy. Over
against the Spinozistic teaching that determination is negation, it
ranges the doctrine that negation is determination, that significant
denial implies and issues in affirmation. Reality is determinate. It
is a unitv that is realized in multiplicity ; it represents an identity
that mediates itself through and in dift'erences which it at once
distinguishes from itself and yet sustains. The infinite or abso-
lute is self-determining and self-developing. Hence it is not sub-
stance but spirit. As spirit it is characterized by life, and the
knowledge of it therefore involves a rational comprehension of
all its developmental stages and processional expressions. Such
comprehension is possible. For the absolute spirit—to borrow He-
gel's way of putting it— is not envious but discloses itself to the
knowing mind of man^ ; it does not remain hidden but wills to be
known and does reveal its inmost nature to human reason. Reality,
to be sure, is not, and will never be, known in the fullness of its
detail
;
yet in principle it is knowable. Metaphysical agnosticism
may seem modest yet it is false. The declaration that reality is
unknowable can be based only on some knowledge of reality. To
know a limit is already to have transcended it. Similarly, opposi-
tions and antitheses, in so far as they appear as such to thought,
are Vpso fticto already in principle overcome and require only an
explicit integration into syntheses. The Kantian doctrine of things-
in-themselves therefore succumbs to attacks from this line of ap-
proach as well as from a true apprehension of the nature and sta-
tus of the categories.
9
"To say that we cannot penetrate into the essence of nature, to say that
we cannot grasp the nature of God, is to believe that he is envious. God
communicates and reveals what he is" (JVerke, VI, pp. 277 f.) Also: "The
inscription on the veil of Isis vanishes before thought" (Ibid., VII, p. 16).
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The debate over the vahdity of Hegel's general point of view
and central teachings is not likely soon to terminate. But even
among the doubters and deniers there are many who find in Hegel's
detailed treatments of philosophical principles and systems, of poli-
tics, of art, and of religion many insights and interpretations which
impress them as penetrating and fruitful. Hegel's style, as well as his
thought, imposes a heavy burden upon the reader. Yet scattered
throughout his writing are epigrammatic statements of unusual power,
and metaphors which, as "living flowers of imagination," brighten
the difficult path which a student of Hegel must tread. That the
path yields ample rewards for him who has the strength and the
resolution to persist thereon is today more widely acknowledged,
perhaps, than at any time since Hegel's death a hundred years ago.
